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warning I lose $42,000 on an escrow.com transaction as pdd.com, help please.

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Hi,
I bought pdd.com via escrow.com and the seller took the domain back on networksolutions.com after he received the money $42,000 US dollar.

for detailed information, please view http://www.drjw.com/

Any suggestions about what I can do is welcome, thank you!

If you know a lawyer who is an expert in online domain name disputes, please tell me his/her contact information, thank you very much!
 
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The views expressed on this page by users and staff are their own, not those of NamePros.
Hi,

Sorry to hear about your loss. I know it is little late but when we do Five Figure or bigger transaction we must use "Concierge Service" in Escrow.com. In that situation Name get transfer from Seller account to Escrow.com account and from Escrow.com account to your account. In that situation if you lose name then it is liability of Escrow.com. This is for other friends who may do bigger transaction in future.

In meantime let me find out more helpful info if I can.

Again sorry to hear about it.

Thanks
 
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When I was at escrow.com we used to have relationships with IC3.gov and many agents within the FBI who specialized in cyber-crime. Maybe they still do, but this was the first call I would make after verifying that a crime had taken place.

Having seen a number of instances of this sort of thing since you left, Brandon, I would suggest that practices have changed markedly.

Twice in the last year, I have seen instances in which Escrow.com falsely confirmed receipt of funds and then, to cover up their error, started flinging bizarre accusations at others.

Here's a real beauty, and I apologize for the digression, but people should know what kind of outfit Escrow.com has become.

The scenario is that the parties set up a payment transaction with Escrow.com. Escrow.com then confirmed receipt of payment In reliance on Escrow.com's confirmation, the domain name is transferred.

Then, a month later Escrow.com realizes they screwed up, so they actually send this to the registrar (and see my comments after):

----------------------------------
Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: STOLEN DOMAIN NAME - XXX

We refer to the domain name XXX which Mr XXX has had in his possession since XXX, 2017 and understand that you are the registrar for that domain name.

Mr XXX still has an outstanding amount of $1,594.50 owed by him to our company, Escrow.com <http://Escrow.com> (“Escrow”).

We have tried to contact Mr XXX multiple times by way of several email addresses and a telephone number. All attempts have been unsuccessful.

Mr XXX is in possession of this domain name, not having paid for it. Mr XXX must pay this amount immediately or we will be forced to commence legal proceedings and/or contact the relevant governing authorities to recover the outstanding amount of $1,594.50.

We ask that you please lock XXX until Mr XXX pays Escrow the outstanding amount.

We look forward to hearing from you.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Yours Faithfully,

Syan Olsen.


--
Syan Olsen
In-house Legal Counsel

Level 20,
680 George Street
Sydney, NSW 2000
Australia

-------------------------------------

The operative question here is if Mr. XXX didn't pay escrow.com, then how does he have the domain name?

This was Escrow.com transaction ID #2960125 should Ms Olsen ever decide to respond to my reply to her ridiculous email (which was sent to a party that was neither the registrar, buyer or seller in the actual transaction).

What Ms. Olsen neglected to mention in any of this was that on Mar-17-2017 in that transaction, Escrow.com confirmed receipt of the buyer's payment. A month later they go claiming that the domain name was stolen because they didn't receive payment.

From the "you have one job" department, you might think, and I'm pretty sure the California Financial Code Section 17414 assumes, that the business of a licensed escrow company is to accurately confirm whether they have been paid or not, before they issue a confirmation of payment.

No, Ms. Olsen, as an escrow provider, you do not "confirm receipt of payment" to the parties to a transaction, then a month later realize you didn't get it, or else you lost it among your other interesting accounting oddities, and claim that the name was "stolen" as a consequence of the parties' reliance on you to do the only job you had.

I mean, just take a look at Olsen's email, and construct in your mind a set of facts under which (a) someone would have taken possession of a domain name before Escrow.com got paid, and (b) anyone in their right mind, let alone Godaddy (to whom the email was directed) would give two shits about an email from an Australian lawyer making unverified claims over threatened "legal action" for an amount of $1,594.50.

I suppose the reaction by GoDaddy was supposed to be "Oh, gollly, an escrow company screwed up their job. We'll get on this one right away!"

But Escrow.com has a curious definition of "stolen":

1. Parties agree on terms at Escrow.com.
2. Escrow.com confirms receipt of payment.
3. Parties transfer name.
4. A month later Escrow.com changes its mind, decides they weren't paid at step 2.

No, that's not "stolen", that's monumental incompetence and a violation of California law by Escrow.com.

What's truly amazing to me from the "your job, do you know how to do it" department, is that Escrow.com screwed up in the amount of $1500 and some change. Instead of eating their mistake, they decide to advertise their incompetence to others, on the assumption that losing $1500 is somehow worse than sending an email saying "We don't know what we're doing." (and on top of that, copying the email to someone who wasn't even involved with registration or transfer of the domain name)
 
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Just my thoughts - If this is all true this isn't the first time someone has been scammed and bought a stolen domain using escrow.com's service. Unless they have changed their terms of service it is the buyer's responsibility to do the due diligence on the ownership of the domain being purchased. The escrow company does not assume liability for the domain ownership, I expect this would also apply to the concierge service if used for the transaction. This is no different than buying a stolen vehicle, it will be returned to the rightful owner and you need to do battle with the person you bought it from. Back in the day, when something like this came to light the first thing to do is alert the bank and attempt to recall the payment. Since this needs to happen almost immediately chances are it is too late here. When I was at escrow.com we used to have relationships with IC3.gov and many agents within the FBI who specialized in cyber-crime. Maybe they still do, but this was the first call I would make after verifying that a crime had taken place. Working with these contacts we were able to get the funds returned occasionally. I expect some of you reading this were either beneficiaries of these relationships or unfortunately ended up losing your funds. Fortunately, escrow.com does know where the funds were sent and will be able to turn the information over to law enforcement once it is determined a crime has occured. They could also be proactive and file a Suspicious Activity Report with FinCEN, I don't believe escrow.com is registered with FinCEN. Escrow companies used to be exempt, but money services businesses must be registered. A Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) is a document that financial institutions must file with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) following a suspected incident of money laundering or fraud. These reports are required under the United States Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970. Anyway, best of luck and may the good guys win.
 
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Just a quick story form the "wayback" machine you might find interesting and not an implication that this couldn't/wouldn't have happened on my watch. And please understand I do not know anything about the current policies and management accountability at the company since it has been over two years since my departure.

We had a transaction in late 2015 just prior to freelancer taking over. It was a three letter .com selling for $48,000. At the time all transactions over $15,000 had to be reviewed by my before funds were released. Sandra Gordon came to me with a concern over a transaction. Buyer and seller had passed KYC requirements and the domain had been transferred to the buyer who accepted it, our job was done once we paid the seller. But the seller was from Tennessee and the funds were being sent to eastern Europe. It didn't pass the smell test. Looking further I found the domain was actively being used as a redirect by a company in Tennessee. I called the company at the number on the website, explained I was the president of escrow.com calling about the sale of their domain. The woman that answered the phone listened patiently and said the domain wasn't for sale and hung up. I called back a second time and asked to speak to a manager. After explaining the situation again I got the same response and click. The letter .coms were very hot back then and they must have been getting a lot of calls. The third time I called before I could say anything the reply was "The domain is not for sale", click. Now at this point it was more of a challenge and I was getting pissed. On the website there were contact emails and I sent a very detailed email to everyone I could find. Within fifteen minutes I received a call from the CIO who confirmed my suspicions, their account had been hacked. In the end the domain was transferred back to the owner and the funds were returned to the buyer. I received a very nice letter from the CEO of the company that was later shared with me.

I do want to conclude by saying that it is not the responsibility of the escrow company to do the due diligence for the buyer. If you know the deal is too good to be true stay away from it, regardless of whether of not you are using an escrow company.
 
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But if they did this, would this set some type of precedent, for all future (and perhaps previous) instances, of stolen domain sales at Escrow?

Here's the simple thing about being a decent person, which is anathema to the way that most people conduct business.

One day, I was walking down the sidewalk and some elderly guy had tripped, fallen in the street, and was having a hard time getting up, since he'd banged himself up pretty good. With the help of another bystander, we got him to his feet, I hailed a cab, gave the driver enough cash to get anywhere in Philly and told the driver to take him wherever he wanted to go.

Am I obligated to do that in every future instance? No.

I mean, if I did that every time, then before long there would be a conspiracy of old guys and cab drivers looking for me on the street, faking falling down, and getting my money!

Oh, well, I took a risk that maybe it wasn't a scam, and maybe things were, that day, exactly as they appeared to be. On the other hand, maybe some old guy and a cabbie made off with my money. But, it sure looked to me like some old guy had fainted, and it would be a good idea to just get him where he wanted to go.

Businesses can do the same thing at their discretion - i.e. take a risk once in a long while if the circumstances appear to them to be compelling. When, as a business, you decide to eat a mistake or do someone a favor out of sheer voluntary decency, you are NOT obligated to do it every time, in every circumstance, for every customer. In fact, when doing so, you can point out that "we are not obligated to do this, but have decided to do so as a completely voluntary accommodation to you".

"But then we'll have millions at our door asking for the same consideration" is the argument against that.

Well, maybe, once in a million times, someone gets lucky, and that's all there is to it. Not every lottery ticket is a winner. Actually, that's the sort of risk that Netsol took when they decided they had enough to go on that it looked pretty much like a stolen name, and in the course of transferring it back to the original registrant, I can guarantee you that Netsol got an indemnification from the registrant against any other claims, and that Netsol had given that victim enough of a sniff test to decide they were good enough to issue that indemnification.

But what do we have here, really, and I mean no offense to anyone. We have some WHOIS history on what looks like a stolen name. We have a psedonymous posting on an internet message board, and a website claiming some facts.

Escrow.com did everything they were supposed to do here, within the limit of their contractual obligation. I like to give Jackson a hard time to keep him on his toes, but neither he, nor Escrow.com are obligated to do diddly-squat. That's where the "legal" part of this picture begins and ends. I participate here for free, and I just want to make sure that if Jackson is reading Namepros while getting paid, he has to earn it.

Jackson's going to repeat - correctly - that Escrow.com could get into a lot of trouble if they started handing out customer information. Yep, theoretically they could. There would be an element of risk for Escrow.com to give out that information, based on whatever level of confidence they could or could not develop that there was hanky-panky going on somewhere. Escrow.com does not have the information that, say, Netsol does with the account logs. They would certainly know, for example, whether "Patrick Sitrok" was the name on the bank account which received the funds, what country those funds went to, whether that makes sense in the context of a domain name registered to a business in Indiana, their own server logs, and so on. Based on that, they could assess the likelihood of the thief then identifying him/herself in an action against them premised on release of his/her confidential information. But they do not have to do any of that, and I certainly don't know what information they do or do not have.

That is why, early on, I had said, that one could file a John Doe lawsuit, subpoena the information from Escrow.com, and after burning through that pile of cash, one could get the data.

The thing about being "consistent" and "zero tolerance, no exceptions" policies is that lawyers believe in them almost as an article of religious faith with total blindness to what can be the consequences of "zero tolerance, no exceptions" policies. This is why, in the US, we lock up children for pretending a banana is a gun and why Escrow.com will "safeguard the confidentiality" of a thief. Now, and I probably can't say this enough, whether or not Escrow.com has sufficient information to satisfy some threshold of "maybe there isn't much risk here" is entirely up to whomever their largest shareholder might be.

Legality and humanity are not the same thing.

Against all that is also the skill that scammers can employ to construct a set of apparent facts which are not what they appear to be.

Let's take this hypothetical:

The company in Indiana is actually behind all this. They get together with someone in another country to make it look like their domain name is stolen. They have the "thief" sell the name, get the money, then go to Netsol to get the domain name back, split the proceeds, and now, with domainers aware that pdd.com is lightly used by someone who might want to sell it, they can sell the name again.

It's far-fetched, but is it impossible? Well, yeah, sure it's possible. Is it likely? No.

We tend to play the odds continuously in our own lives. If I hear hoofbeats approaching down the street from around a corner, I assume it is a horse and not a zebra. But the weird thing about it is that there seems to be legions of people who step out of normality from 9 to 5 when it comes to running a business and say, "Well, we can't just assume it's a horse, since it might be a zebra."

Once in a while - and it's a personal threshold - you just might want to not ask yourself "but what if it's a zebra? I can't take a chance on thinking it's a horse" to avoid the slow death of your own humanity in the world of "zero tolerance, no exceptions".

Finally, I like to pick on Jackson, and he knows that. That's why he makes the big bucks. Nobody's paying me a salary to read Namepros.

Clearly, what any customer using Escrow.com to transfer domain names should do, is to get past the "This is the safest, securest, most risky-free thing on the planet" advertising copy on the site, and should take a look at the helpful information that Escrow.com provides on their site about how things might go wrong, or what steps someone might take before assuming that Escrow.com is a completely sufficient mechanism for avoiding scams.

For example, take a look at Escrow.com's article "Before you buy a domain name" which explains how you can understand how to access whois history or website history information, and the various steps you might take in different situations to confirm the chain of title of a domain name.

Or, for example, take a look at Escrow.com's "Domain buying checklist" which provides a useful step-by-step reference for things you'll want to look at before you buy a domain name, like the simple step of seeing if an address makes sense by using Google maps and asking the other party why they live in a strip mall.

Escrow.com provides those useful articles on their site about how to protect yourself because they care about much more than collecting their fees from people pushing the buttons.

I mean, if it wasn't for the fact that Escrow.com provided all that useful information on additional steps to protect yourself from scams, then I might get the impression that they expected you to simply make the assumptions that their advertising copy suggests.
 
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Hey American, here's what I see, you will need to contact Web/Network solution to get the domain back, since you have sales transaction.

Here's the problem, you should never accept a cancel and get your money back. Why? By agreeing to cancel the deal, Web/Networksolution believes that they are off the hook in the first place.

By agreeing to cancel, you and the seller have accepted a mutual agreement that the domain will go back to the owner. However, your money, if the owner decides not to send you back your money, you will have to send a report to Texas or wherever that person lives. Which is another bigger problem.

1)By releasing funds via Escrow you have made an agreement that you got the domain name.
Which is not a problem
2) By agreeing to cancel the deal you have released Network Solution and Web of any liability because you say you and the seller agree. >>>>>>>Email Seller to PUSH back domain. Ask him why is it still in his account.

For WEB They are liable for pushing back a domain name, you can sue them in China. Web/NS is a large company and is liable if they push back the domain unlawfully, and they will have to pay fines too. DO not write email to seller to agree, by agreeing, you lose all rights, WEB/NS will no longer be liable, you can no longer contact NS/Web for support if you agree to cancel the deal.

You will need to ask the domain back. Because the seller will probably send your email of agreement to WEB where they will say if both side agrees they are no longer liable.

Contact web. Get your domain back. Tell the seller to push the domain again.
 
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by no means would we ignore a customer or their requests because their transaction has closed.

It's so good to hear from you, and only three days after the anniversary of your continuing to ignore my email of 6 January 2017 concerning transaction #2162718. Perhaps you will be replying soon?

Here's another gem from someone who calls himself a "Security Engineer" at Escrow.com concerning a very similar set of circumstances which was fortunately and ultimately addressed by an appropriate lawsuit.

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On Wed, Jan 4, 2017 7:26:40 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Hi XXX,

Thanks for getting back to us.

The wire transfer receipt is false as the funds never reached our account (it was this receipt that caused us to prematurely and incorrectly mark the transaction as paid).

Regards,

Nicholas Hairs
Security Engineer
Escrow.com

Sent from my mobile.

e: [email protected]
w: www.escrow.com
pgp: 0x670AF0C90C3AD4F6
--------------------

For those playing along at home: A buyer in an Escrow.com sent Escrow.com a fake wire transfer document, which Escrow.com then relied upon in order to issue a payment confirmation - instead of checking their own bank account to see if they had received the payment.

What was particularly inept about this "Security Engineer" email, was that he was replying to a registrar support person who had already told him that the confirmation in question, which had been relied upon by the parties, was the "payment confirmation" issued by Escrow.com. We never saw the fake receipt that Mr. Hairs was talking about. Mr. Hairs just went the extra mile of stating that Escrow.com did not check its own bank account to see if they had received the money, before issuing a confirmation that they had received the money.

So, in other words, when Escrow.com sends a "confirmation" that they have received payment, then you can take them at their word that maybe they did receive it, or maybe they didn't receive it. They'll be sure to let you know, oh, maybe a month or two later.
 
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Hi,

Unfortunately this may be a case of stolen domains. Now see full details below.

PDD.com Real Owner before Transaction whose email address is [email protected]

PDD.JPG



PDD.com Escrow.com Transaction Owner whose email address is [email protected] which does not match with Owner's email address before transaction (See above).

PDD Escrow.JPG



3620.com Real Owner before Transaction whose email address is [email protected]

3620.JPG



3620.com Sedo.com Transaction Owner whose email address is [email protected] which does not match with Owner's email address before transaction (See above).

3620 Sedo.JPG



Sedo has history of stolen domains listed for sale. They had taken some steps sometimes to delist it and sometimes little late. In this case looks like they were late.

In short when we do this kind of transaction we need to do our own investigation as well. @.NJ & @imadoer is very good friend of mine and I have learned a lot from him. We need to be very careful when we do big transaction like this.

Still let me try to find out more detail how to get money back. Unfortunately there is high probability these are stolen names. That is the reason NetworkSolutions.com may have locked your account even it was not your fault. Now I think we need to focus on how to get money back rather than how to get names back. Just my thought. Still lets work together to get to the root of this issue.

Let me try to find out more and I will share more if I find some more helpful info.

Sorry to hear about this.

Thanks
 
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Again, I apologize for the digression.

As for the transaction which is the subject of this thread. Here's what happened:

1. Domain name was stolen by hacker who took control of it.

2. Domain name was offered for sale to OP.

3. Parties set up transaction at Escrow.com.

4. Escrow.com got paid. Domain name was transferred to OP's account by hacker. Escrow.com relied on buyer's notification that the domain name was transferred.

5. Theft victim contacted Netsol, provided enough evidence to establish it was really them and/or other information.

6. Netsol looked at access logs for the account, and other information available to them to establish it was unlikely that that victim is lying about the theft, and transferred it back to the victim. Netsol also likely noted suspicious activity in connection with another domain name recently transferred to that account.

To draw some lines about "who did anything wrong" here....

1. Netsol - their system worked as intended. They received a report from one of their customers about a stolen domain name, and transferred it back. The OP is disappointed not to have been consulted. The only thing the OP can demonstrate is that the OP paid Escrow.com for purchase of the domain name to a person who has never been associated with the domain name, and it is highly likely that Netsol didn't get any response at all from the gmail.com email address with which the domain name had been briefly associated. Given the longstanding registration, the fact that the registrant is an easily-verified existing Indiana corporation, and the likely odd location, proxies, etc. that were used to access the account, the circumstances easily passed the credibility threshold for them that the name was stolen. So, they returned it. It's not usual for a domain name to sit unchanged for many years by a customer in Indiana, and then suddenly get a bunch of updates and confirmation clicks from somewhere else on the planet.

2. Escrow.com - they promise that they will receive funds and hold them until it is confirmed that the domain name is transferred. The buyer paid, the funds were received, the buyer confirmed receipt of the domain name. Boom - their job was done. They don't promise that there are no outstanding legal claims against a domain name, that the domain name is legitimately registered to whomever is selling it, or whatever.

This thread is kind of eye-opening to me, as I was unaware of the pervasive naivete among many members of this forum on how things can go wrong, or what sorts of things might be useful when things do go wrong. If anything, I guess part of that is the way that Escrow.com markets its service, which may convey a broader impression of security than many people believe. I mean, sure, could Escrow.com provide information on "things you might look into" before buying a domain name, to avoid being taken in? Yes, but that would be a silly move for them on a website festooned with pictures of locks and slogans like "SAFELY BUY AND SELL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES FROM $100 TO $10 MILLION OR MORE" on it.

Escrow.com has a very narrow job. Their marketing probably makes people think that they are immune from being scammed through them. You are not immune from that. Escrow.com has no duty or obligation to look at the history of the name, whether or not the domain data and their seller payment data make any sense, or the numerous other warning signs that were obviously present here. Escrow.com is not going to inform you of these kinds of things either, because it detracts from the impression they are trying to convey, in order to get a fee out of you.

But, for reals, I would be amused if the OP asks Escrow.com for the transaction fee back, and posts their reply here. Send an email to Syan Olsen, and call it a "Stolen transaction fee". And keep us updated on all of the overwhelming help and support you are getting from Mr. Elsegood. Because I would really like to see the "We understand you were robbed, but we are keeping your $373.80" email.

We may not know much about the rest of it, but we know that Escrow.com got $373.80 of your money, and you got nothing. I'm certain that qualifies for Ms. Olsen's peculiar definition of a theft.
 
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Escrow.com takes the confidentiality of customer data extremely seriously and will not release another customer's data based on accusations

As I already said, you won't give out the payment information, because this thief's confidentiality is taken extremely seriously. Yes. No surprises there. I already had posted that.

And, yes, your Chinese language support team is assisting the buyer in understanding that the buyer is well and truly screwed.

I am certain that your Chinese language support team has informed the OP that they can file a lawsuit and subpoena the information from you. Yes?

As for "requests from law enforcement" I suppose you will also clue in the OP as to the FBI's monetary threshold of "we don't care", which is well in excess of $42,000.
 
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This was obviously a stolen name.

Teradomain missed a step in the sequence above.

This domain name was registered for over two decades to a company in Indiana:

Registrant Name: Professional Data Dimensions
Registrant Organization: Professional Data Dimensions
Registrant Street: 200 S MERIDIAN ST STE 301
Registrant City: INDIANAPOLIS
Registrant State/Province: IN
Registrant Postal Code: 46225-1076
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: 317 636 7355

...and for most of the time since the early 2000's, the admin contact was:

Registrant Email: [email protected]


In late October / early November 2017, the admin contact changed to:

Registrant Email: [email protected]


Then, on 21 November, the name went into privacy registration.

It was pretty obviously a stolen name, since Professional Data Dimensions is still in business with pdd.com:

https://www.linkedin.com/company/professional-data-dimensions/

That phone number is the same phone number as is listed on the last capture of their website at:

http://www.screenshots.com/pdd.com/

The "seller's address" from the Sedo transaction page is 14999 Preston Road in Dallas. That is a shopping mall:

https://www.google.com/maps/place/1...35e7e91ca0d90a!8m2!3d32.9525872!4d-96.8051627

Obviously, there is no "Patrick Sitrok" with that address. In fact, if you Google "Patrick Sitrok", you primarily come up with this thread. There is no "Patrick Sitrok" at all.

if they steal your newly acquired domain, this wont happen if you have changed registrar, I have not heard of this happening once

Then you haven't heard enough. It can be more difficult, but some registrars will cooperate to return a stolen domain name.

Would Escrow.com be on the hook if they did not properly research the Seller and the Account they used

Dream on.

Here's the bottom line:

1. The name was stolen from Professional Data Dimensions. You aren't going to get the name from them.

2. There is no Patrick Sitrok, and the person who was corresponding with you is not an English speaker.

3. The money is long gone. You aren't going to get that back either.

4. Netsol is not going to help you. They restored a stolen name to their customer.

5. Escrow.com paid out the proceeds to whatever bank information they were given. They can't get it back and they aren't going to help you. Like Netsol, they are going to stop answering your emails.
 
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get as much forensic evidence as possible from Escrow.com: IP addresses used, E-mail accounts, bank details.

They will not voluntarily provide that. You'd first have to file a "John Doe t/a 'Patrick Sitrok'" suit, and then subpoena that information from Escrow.com. That will burn you through your first $20k, and get you to the point where you can then subpoena any financial institutions to find out the money went somewhere where it would cost you even more to chase down the rathole.

So, let me give you one of an infinite number of scenarios here.

You file your John Doe suit in, let's pick Virginia since it's a .com name with some connection to Virginia, you get the information from Escrow.com by subpoena. As luck would have it, the bank is also located in the US, so you can subpoena them too. You find out the bank account, which has since been closed, belonged to some person who answered an ad on Craigslist for "Make money at home buying Bitcoin", and is no longer living in the rented trailer in Podunk that they used as an address at that time. Amazingly, after spending more money, you find out they are living under a railroad bridge in Mexico. Now what? The funds are untraceable, and you found yourself a penniless smurf. Waddya do, get a judgment in the US and then spend more money to enforce it in Mexico to get their sleeping blanket?

I mean, where do any of you think a legal action of any imagined kind is going to lead? Escrow.com will provide account information of a US account holder who is just sitting at home waiting for you to show up with a summons?

People who engage in fraud have the advantage of knowing that they are engaging in fraud. They worked out how to steal the name in the first place, but it's not as if they did that and then thought, "Gee, now what do we do with the money to make it untraceable to me?" That was the FIRST part of the plan.
 
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so are we to conclude here that previous owner did not notify netsol his name got stolen?

im having a bit difficulty understanding why netsol waited for this to get sold and pushed before returning it to original owner, which I assume is what took place.

Netsol didn't "wait" for anything, and the owner apparently notified Netsol relatively promptly, as these things go.

Most of the time, the owner of a stolen name does not know the name has been stolen. PDD has had this name since 1996. Do you think they check their WHOIS details every day or something? It's not as if the domain name stops working.

Most of the time, the thief keeps the nameservers the same, while carefully managing the hacked admin contact email address to keep the owner from receiving any notifications when the admin contact email and/or account email is updated.

Usually, the owner does not know the name is stolen UNTIL after the name is fobbed off onto the buyer.

But when you see a domain name which has been used by the same people for more than 20 years, followed by a recent WHOIS change to a free email account, and then a sale proposal, it's time to get in touch with that 20 year user to find out what's what. Now, sure, it CAN happen that because they haven't updated the WHOIS information in a long time, the recent update was part of preparing the domain name for sale. In this instance, picking up the telephone and getting in touch using the same telephone number that's been there for years - is in the WHOIS history and is on the screenshots.co captures - would have been a good idea.

It's also a good idea to avoid the "previous employee" problem. Melissa Kittrell hasn't worked at PDD since 2010:

https://www.linkedin.com/in/melissakittrell/

It may be that they kept the [email protected] email address active and in-house, but it is also interesting that the email changed from [email protected] to [email protected]. In other words, one of two things had to happen. Obviously, a thief could Google "kittrell" and "professional data" to find out just who Melissa Kittrell is, in order to come up with an email address that includes more of her name than just "mkittrell". But, there again was another obvious pre-purchase diligence angle to check out - why did the name change to a gmail address suggestive of a name of a person who hasn't worked there for seven years?

There could be a lot of different answers to that question, some of those answers could be fine, but the WHOIS history and record of use of this domain name provides, as noted above, red flags all over the place.
 
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You should contact escrow.com. They should be able to assist you in getting your domain. You have proof you paid and proof of the sale.
 
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Congratulations! If you made it this far, like me, you've wasted a lot of time you will never get back or be paid for.

However, to make it a little worthwhile, I have collected a few quotes which might, at least, be of help to you in the future...

In the last year, I have seen the most amazingly incompetent things done at Escrow.com.

Having seen a number of instances of this sort of thing since you left, Brandon, I would suggest that practices have changed markedly.

Twice in the last year, I have seen instances in which Escrow.com falsely confirmed receipt of funds and then, to cover up their error, started flinging bizarre accusations at others.

Here's a real beauty, and I apologize for the digression, but people should know what kind of outfit Escrow.com has become.

The scenario is that the parties set up a payment transaction with Escrow.com. Escrow.com then confirmed receipt of payment In reliance on Escrow.com's confirmation, the domain name is transferred.

Then, a month later Escrow.com realizes they screwed up, so they actually send this to the registrar (and see my comments after):

----------------------------------
Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: STOLEN DOMAIN NAME - XXX

We refer to the domain name XXX which Mr XXX has had in his possession since XXX, 2017 and understand that you are the registrar for that domain name.

Mr XXX still has an outstanding amount of $1,594.50 owed by him to our company, Escrow.com <http://Escrow.com> (“Escrow”).

We have tried to contact Mr XXX multiple times by way of several email addresses and a telephone number. All attempts have been unsuccessful.

Mr XXX is in possession of this domain name, not having paid for it. Mr XXX must pay this amount immediately or we will be forced to commence legal proceedings and/or contact the relevant governing authorities to recover the outstanding amount of $1,594.50.

We ask that you please lock XXX until Mr XXX pays Escrow the outstanding amount.

We look forward to hearing from you.

If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Yours Faithfully,

Syan Olsen.


--
Syan Olsen
In-house Legal Counsel

Level 20,
680 George Street
Sydney, NSW 2000
Australia

-------------------------------------

The operative question here is if Mr. XXX didn't pay escrow.com, then how does he have the domain name?

This was Escrow.com transaction ID #2960125 should Ms Olsen ever decide to respond to my reply to her ridiculous email (which was sent to a party that was neither the registrar, buyer or seller in the actual transaction).

What Ms. Olsen neglected to mention in any of this was that on Mar-17-2017 in that transaction, Escrow.com confirmed receipt of the buyer's payment. A month later they go claiming that the domain name was stolen because they didn't receive payment.

From the "you have one job" department, you might think, and I'm pretty sure the California Financial Code Section 17414 assumes, that the business of a licensed escrow company is to accurately confirm whether they have been paid or not, before they issue a confirmation of payment.

No, Ms. Olsen, as an escrow provider, you do not "confirm receipt of payment" to the parties to a transaction, then a month later realize you didn't get it, or else you lost it among your other interesting accounting oddities, and claim that the name was "stolen" as a consequence of the parties' reliance on you to do the only job you had.

I mean, just take a look at Olsen's email, and construct in your mind a set of facts under which (a) someone would have taken possession of a domain name before Escrow.com got paid, and (b) anyone in their right mind, let alone Godaddy (to whom the email was directed) would give two sh*ts about an email from an Australian lawyer making unverified claims over threatened "legal action" for an amount of $1,594.50.

I suppose the reaction by GoDaddy was supposed to be "Oh, gollly, an escrow company screwed up their job. We'll get on this one right away!"

But Escrow.com has a curious definition of "stolen":

1. Parties agree on terms at Escrow.com.
2. Escrow.com confirms receipt of payment.
3. Parties transfer name.
4. A month later Escrow.com changes its mind, decides they weren't paid at step 2.

No, that's not "stolen", that's monumental incompetence and a violation of California law by Escrow.com.

What's truly amazing to me from the "your job, do you know how to do it" department, is that Escrow.com screwed up in the amount of $1500 and some change. Instead of eating their mistake, they decide to advertise their incompetence to others, on the assumption that losing $1500 is somehow worse than sending an email saying "We don't know what we're doing." (and on top of that, copying the email to someone who wasn't even involved with registration or transfer of the domain name)

This thread is kind of eye-opening to me, as I was unaware of the pervasive naivete among many members of this forum on how things can go wrong, or what sorts of things might be useful when things do go wrong. If anything, I guess part of that is the way that Escrow.com markets its service, which may convey a broader impression of security than many people believe.

Escrow.com has a very narrow job. Their marketing probably makes people think that they are immune from being scammed through them. You are not immune from that. Escrow.com has no duty or obligation to look at the history of the name, whether or not the domain data and their seller payment data make any sense, or the numerous other warning signs that were obviously present here. Escrow.com is not going to inform you of these kinds of things either, because it detracts from the impression they are trying to convey, in order to get a fee out of you.

Hi John,
Escrow.com takes the confidentiality of customer data extremely seriously and will not release another customer's data based on accusations but does comply with requests from law enforcement.

Our Chinese language support team is in touch with the buyer and assisting, by no means would we ignore a customer or their requests because their transaction has closed.

Jackson Elsegood

And, yes, your Chinese language support team is assisting the buyer in understanding that the buyer is well and truly screwed.

I am certain that your Chinese language support team has informed the OP that they can file a lawsuit and subpoena the information from you. Yes?

As for "requests from law enforcement" I suppose you will also clue in the OP as to the FBI's monetary threshold of "we don't care", which is well in excess of $42,000.

Escrow.com did not check its own bank account to see if they had received the money,

Escrow.com did everything they were supposed to do here, within the limit of their contractual obligation. I like to give Jackson a hard time to keep him on his toes, but neither he, nor Escrow.com are obligated to do diddly-squat. That's where the "legal" part of this picture begins and ends. I participate here for free, and I just want to make sure that if Jackson is reading Namepros while getting paid, he has to earn it.

In other words, you were dishonest and lied to Escrow.com about who you are, and you expect... what?

Just a quick story form the "wayback" machine you might find interesting and not an implication that this couldn't/wouldn't have happened on my watch. And please understand I do not know anything about the current policies and management accountability at the company since it has been over two years since my departure.

We had a transaction in late 2015 just prior to freelancer taking over. It was a three letter .com selling for $48,000. At the time all transactions over $15,000 had to be reviewed by my before funds were released. Sandra Gordon came to me with a concern over a transaction. Buyer and seller had passed KYC requirements and the domain had been transferred to the buyer who accepted it, our job was done once we paid the seller. But the seller was from Tennessee and the funds were being sent to eastern Europe. It didn't pass the smell test. Looking further I found the domain was actively being used as a redirect by a company in Tennessee. I called the company at the number on the website, explained I was the president of escrow.com calling about the sale of their domain. The woman that answered the phone listened patiently and said the domain wasn't for sale and hung up. I called back a second time and asked to speak to a manager. After explaining the situation again I got the same response and click. The letter .coms were very hot back then and they must have been getting a lot of calls. The third time I called before I could say anything the reply was "The domain is not for sale", click. Now at this point it was more of a challenge and I was getting pissed. On the website there were contact emails and I sent a very detailed email to everyone I could find. Within fifteen minutes I received a call from the CIO who confirmed my suspicions, their account had been hacked. In the end the domain was transferred back to the owner and the funds were returned to the buyer. I received a very nice letter from the CEO of the company that was later shared with me.

I do want to conclude by saying that it is not the responsibility of the escrow company to do the due diligence for the buyer. If you know the deal is too good to be true stay away from it, regardless of whether of not you are using an escrow company.
 
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but still have to try hard to get my money or domain name.

If Escrow.com were interested in helping you, they would provide you with all of the data they have on the "seller" - the full contact information they were given, the payment information they used, IP addresses of the transaction page accesses, etc..

Escrow.com is not going to do that voluntarily. Their only concern at this point is keeping the transaction fee they collected from you, and avoiding any liability.
 
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Does escrow provide photo ids even if its fake or any info?

Oh, hell no. If there is anything in the ID or payment information that Escrow.com has which suggests it was dodgy, Escrow.com is certainly not going to give that out. Escrow.com is not going to hand anyone evidence that Escrow.co had reason to believe there was something suspicious about the transaction. Do you think they are crazy?
 
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For transactions above $5k or $10k they should either remind the buyer to do proper due dilligence

That's exactly why I highly recommend reading the articles on Escrow.com's website about things people should look out for.

I'm sure that Escrow.com has seen more scams than I have, and I've seen a lot of them. That is why they have applied their wealth of knowledge and experience to educating users through the informative articles on their site, in order to share the wisdom they've gained.
 
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but I do want to know what does Escrow and NS say about this to the buyer?

Nothing.

They say nothing.

From Netsol's perspective the "buyer" is the person to whom a stolen domain name was transferred. Having dealt with a few domain thieves from the registrar end of things, I can tell you that it becomes pointless to communicate with them, since you only help them understand the registrar's internal processes for investigating these things.

In other words, from where Netsol is sitting, the buyer IS probably the thief - since the person to whom the stolen domain name was moved keeps asking questions. As noted above, it also looks as if this person has another stolen name in their account.

Escrow.com likewise will provide nothing voluntarily. They know they just moved $42k in a transaction involving stolen goods. Their only concern is their own potential liability. In the last year, I have seen the most amazingly incompetent things done at Escrow.com. What do you think they are going to do? Say, "Oh, yeah, um, here's a fake Brazilian driver's license we used in order to verify the identity of someone who had us send money to Indonesia." Absent a subpoena, that's not happening.

They'll simply say that their terms do not allow them to give that information out. Fin.
 
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I'd be surprised, and disheartened if @Jackson Elsegood and/or Escrow.com didn't opt to be proactive, and return the transaction fee to the buyer on their own accord.

Do a nice and voluntary thing for someone who is distraught? Are you mad?

o-HELL-FROZE-OVER-facebook.jpg


They sent that ridiculous email to GoDaddy saying "Hi, we're an incompetent escrow company" to chase after $1500. One might imagine the public relations genius which inspired that idea.
 
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As with anything the squeaky wheel is always the one that is heard. The ones behaving normally get no attention.

Good points.

Nobody calls me up to say, "Hey, I just did some transaction and everything went fine, no problems, and I'm happy." I say, "Hey, that's great" and charge them a fee.

So, in my experience, in 100% of contracts where someone contacts me, something has gone wrong. I never hear about anything going right.
 
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In fraud cases, timing is all important. I believe it could be argued that NetSol's practice of not notifying buyers of stolen domains of such a determination

From Netsol's perspective, there is no meaningful distinction between "buyer of a stolen domain name" and "person who stole the domain name". Two apparently stolen domain names were transferred to an account. What conclusion might someone reach if stolen cars keep ending up in your garage?

And, assuming everything is as it appears here, what difference would it make if Netsol had contacted the person who received the stolen domain name?

One simple question Netsol might ask is, "If you bought the domain name, where did the payment go?" The buyer doesn't know.

Another scenario consistent with the facts is that two friends steal a domain name which has fallen into disuse. Perhaps the registrant organization has gone out of business or otherwise wouldn't notice or care if the domain name was taken. In the course of stealing the name, they engage in a sham Escrow.com transaction in order to make it look like the thief was a defrauded victim in the event that the original registrant notices.

As Teradomain suggests, if we assume that everything posted at drjw.com is legit, we have a domain transfer from "Frank Slakmon" to "Lou Zhiyong", and an Escrow transaction between "Patrick Sitrock" and "Ye Tian".

So, if one considers the material posted at that site, one might ask the basic question of :

"How does 'Ye Tian' paying 'Patrick Sitrock' suggest that 'Lou Zhiyong' bought a domain name from 'Frank Slakmon'?"

There are some other oddities in the material posted at drjw.com. The first is that the "buyer" is apparently aware that the original registrant admin contact was [email protected]. Looking at the second Dec. 13th email, and the posted WHOIS history, the "buyer" states that the domain name was restored "to the original owner". If the buyer knew that [email protected] was the email address of "the original owner" (and the buyer clearly has access to WHOIS history data) does it strike you as odd that neither the escrow transaction or the domain transfer involved "the original owner" which was apparently known to the buyer?
 
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So basically if the Registrar + Escrow worked together, everything would solve itself, provided that they provide information in the first place.

well-theres-your-problem-right-there.jpg


You are essentially correct. They also can't work together for a number of reasons.

The basic problem, which is going to get much worse with GDPR implementation, is that the "sale and payment" system, and the "domain registration and transfer" system, are two independently operating systems.

There are a couple of ways to tackle the consequences of that basic structural problem. One is to have an integrated registrar/marketplace system. The limitations of that system are that transactions can be authoritatively implemented only in relation to names registered with that registrar.

Another is to have a direct channel between the registrar and the "marketplace/payment" system under which the registrar can agree to implement changes based on (a) party confirmation from registrar, (b) payment confirmation from "marketplace/payment" system. This would require a few changes to the registration agreement, and of course the registrar would have to have an incentive to do so, such as a split of fees.

That would solve some problems, but not all.
 
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